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Regulating in Developing Countries: 
Multiple Roles for Medical Research and Products Regulation in Argentina and India 
 
Shawn H.E. Harmon* 
Dina Kale† 
 
Abstract: This paper engages with the complex relationship between innovation 
and human health and the role of regulation in bringing the two together, and, in 
doing so, facilitating inclusive innovation in emerging economies. After outlining 
the contested role of regulation, we provide two case studies: regenerative 
medicine regulation in Argentina, and medical devices regulation in India. While 
these empirically-based case studies examine different scientific sectors in 
different jurisdictions and therefore have different contextual foundations, they 
demonstrate the important link between regulatory policies and the successful 
promotion of innovation. Through them we challenge the oft-repeated complaint 
that regulation stifles innovation, demonstrating that both a lack of regulation 
(Argentina) and poorly conceived regulation (India) are equally damaging to 
innovation, to actor wellbeing, and, ultimately, to human health. We argue that 
devising new forms of regulation can facilitate increased innovation and thus 
improved technological (and economic) competitiveness (ie: social/regulatory 
innovation can lead to improved technological/scientific innovation). 
 
Keywords: regulation, governance, innovation, regenerative medicine, medical 
devices, Argentina, India 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A range of sectors, activities, and technologies rely on the biosciences, which are increasingly 
important for translating technical knowledge into useful products, including ‘bioproducts’ (i.e., 
products that interact with the biological and which might be administered within the clinical or 
consumer context). The biosciences and their resultant biotechnologies are integral to the 
‘bioeconomy’, which, though somewhat amorphous, describes the commercial value of, and 
activities around, biological knowledge and bioproducts, and it is tangled up with the concept 
of ‘innovation’. Sometimes defined as ‘the successful application of new idea to use’ (Kaplinksy 
and Morris, 2008), innovation is the lode-stone of the ‘creative destruction’ claimed by 
Schumpeter (1934, 1942) as necessary for economic development.1 Successful innovation 
                                            
* Lecturer in Regulation and Risk, School of Law, University of Edinburgh; Deputy Director, J Kenyon Mason 
Institute for Medicine, Life Science and Law; Research Associate, Innogen Institute, University of Edinburgh. 
† Lecturer in International Development and Innovation, School of Social and Political Science, Open 
University; Research Fellow, Innogen Institute, Open University. 
1  Innovation can be ‘path-breaking’ or ‘path-following’. The former involves changes deemed to be radical 
or disruptive), whereas the latter, which is more common, relies on small or incremental developments in products 
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requires appropriate linkages between diverse (and often networked) actors, effective nodes 
for consideration of the myriad social concerns and technical hurdles, and space to forge 
unique or alternative practices and processes that are necessary to transform new ideas into 
safe and effective products. Governments seek to encourage these phenomena through 
industrial policies, infrastructure investment, taxation, and regulation.2 
This paper focuses on the last strategy, regulation, and more particularly regulation in 
the health technologies setting. While regulation is often not the main driver of innovation or 
healthcare system evolution (Wolf and Delgado, 2003), it can have profound impacts on 
stakeholder ambitions and activities, and therefore on innovation, on institutional formation, 
and on knowledge-deployment within healthcare systems. It can influence (and sometimes 
determine) the types of enterprises that succeed, the types of knowledge that get privileged, 
and the types of structures that evolve, and so impact on the dynamism of whole disciplines or 
sectors (Tait, 2007). Indeed, regulation has been described as a powerful determinant of what 
we even consider to be ‘innovative’ (Bud, 1999). In short, regulation can be an important 
feature of both the innovation and the healthcare landscapes – which are increasingly 
overlapping – and of the broader governance processes and structures by which these 
landscapes are managed (Lyall, Papaioannou and Smith, 2009; Tӧmmel and Verdun, 2009). 
In this paper, we are concerned with regulatory vacuums and the subsequent 
production of regulation in middle-income countries (or emerging jurisdictions) over which 
there has been limited attention, namely Argentina and India. The former was the subject of an 
ESRC-funded project called ‘Governing Emerging Technologies: Stem Cell Research and Social 
Values in Argentina’ (GET),3 which gathered qualitative data around key issues of ‘regenerative 
medicine’ research governance in Argentina, particularly the role of regulation in facilitating 
research and the values that should underlie that regulation.4 The latter was the subject of an 
Innogen-hosted project called the ‘Medical Device Project’ (MDP),5 which investigated key 
factors hampering development in India’s medical device industry (MDI), exploring in particular 
the role of regulation in the effective diffusion of technology.6 In short, both projects focussed 
                                                                                                                                            
or processes within a firm, sector, region, or globally. Transistors and integrated circuits are examples of 
innovations which caused creative destruction and shifted how actors provide products and offer services. 
2  The impact of government investment and regulation can be observed in the case of the pharmaceuticals 
industries. In 1880, Germany and Switzerland were at the forefront of drug development and manufacturing. The 
outbreak of World War II, however, prompted the US to foster massive chemical analysis and commercial 
production techniques (Henderson et al., 2007). The resultant system significantly improved productivity, and it 
provided the platform for the US to leapfrog European pharmaceutical companies. 
3  See http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/esrcvaluesproject/. 
4  The term ‘regenerative medicine’ refers to that interdisciplinary ‘field’ of research and clinical applications 
focused on the repair, replacement, or regeneration of cells, tissues, or organs to restore function caused by 
disease, defect, injury, or ageing. It relies on multiple converging (and emerging) technologies to move healthcare 
options beyond traditional therapies, and specifically into approaches that rely on or support the body’s own 
healing capacity. Component technologies include gene therapy, stem cell therapy, and tissue engineering (Daar 
and Greenwood, 2007). 
5  See http://www.innogen.ac.uk/people/Dinar%20Kale. 
6  The term ‘medical devices’ captures both simple and highly sophisticated equipment (e.g., everything 
from tongue depressors, medical gloves and bandages, to surgical lasers, pacemakers, dialysis machines and heart 
valves) (WHO, 2010). In contrast to ‘medicinal products’, whose primary mode of action is metabolic, 
immunological, or pharmacological, ‘medical devices’ are instruments, implants, or machines intended to be used, 
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on fields which are driven by innovation and which are dramatically realigning healthcare and 
industry practices not only in the subject jurisdictions but around the world. While they were 
not designed or conducted as a ‘pair’, they are appropriately considered together because both 
were informed by the broad relationship between innovation and governance, both reflect a 
desire to better understand the formation, design, and impact of regulation, and both 
investigate stakeholder activities and concerns around health-related innovation through 
empirical research within that emerging jurisdiction. 
In the following pages, we introduce the projects that underlie the case-studies, first 
describing their objectives and methodologies, and then summarising the backgrounds which 
informed them. We then offer our findings, structuring the discussion around some key issues, 
namely current regulatory shortcomings and consequences, regulatory objectives or ambitions, 
and identification of standards. We conclude that regulation can be a boon rather than a 
burden for a host of reasons only peripherally relevant to risk (which is the most 
overwhelmingly common driver of regulation). The case-studies also support the conclusion 
that these jurisdictions (and other similarly situated jurisdictions confronting challenges quite 
different from those in developed countries) should make every effort to avoid recreating the 
‘should we / shouldn’t we’ debate about regulation. Favouring collaborative regulatory design 
over this dead-end debate could open opportunities to explore new and smarter forms of 
regulation which might better generate improved bioscience innovations and medical 
interventions. Before we turn to the case-studies, however, we articulate our concept of 
regulation, and the nature of the debates that have characterised its evolution. 
 
2. Regulation 
 
The concept of ‘regulation’ is not uncontested, and the range of instruments and actions caught 
by the term can expand or shrink depending on the specific definition adopted. We view 
regulation as a process involving the sustained attempt to control, order or influence the 
behaviour of actors so as to produce identified outcomes. These outcomes should be closely 
tied (or rationally connected) to the means supported by the regulation for generating 
influence. While it is possible that a single actor could define all of the key objectives and all of 
the necessary influence-generating roles and powers to pursue them, such will be extremely 
rare; many fields, including the technologies innovation and healthcare fields, have very diffuse 
or ‘decentred’ operational environments; environments that exhibit characteristics that can 
frustrate the smooth transformation of policy intent to lived reality, namely complexity, 
fragmentation, and interdependence (Black, 2001).  
 With respect to complexity, social problems are caused by many interacting factors, not 
all of which may be known, the nature and relevance of which may shift over time, and the 
interaction between which will be imperfectly understood. Additionally, interactions between 
relevant actors and networks are complex and dynamic because of diverse and shifting 
interests, objectives, powers, and norms; many actors relevant to a problem will develop 
autonomously and their behaviour will not remain constant, making interactions hard to 
                                                                                                                                            
alone or in combination, for one or more specific purposes such as diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment, 
or alleviation of disease (Shah and Goyal, 2008). 
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predict and hard to manage (Black, 2001). Moreover, new stimulants (including the 
introduction of regulatory instruments) will produce behavioural changes, some unintended, 
that will be uneven across different actors, thereby adding to the fragmentary nature of the 
environment. 
 Second, both knowledge and power/control are fragmented. Knowledge fragmentation 
is more than just information asymmetry, although that persists. Rather, it is a recognition that 
complex and dynamic problems require more knowledge than any one body can have, and no 
entity has either the breadth of vision necessary to employ all relevant instruments to their 
maximum effect, or the power necessary to wield them all even if they had the sufficiently 
broad perspective (Black, 2001). Power is also fragmented or dispersed, and regulation occurs 
in many locations and fora, a natural consequence of regulation relying variously on 
international treaties, agreements and declarations, national legislation and derivative 
statutory instruments, industry and professional guidelines or codes, and the evolving norms of 
established and emerging actor networks. The courts are also important regulatory institutions, 
with the ability to shape sectors; the US Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v Chakrabarty, 
for example, has been credited with a significant role in the rise of the biotechnology industry.7 
 Interdependence describes the reality that, despite some (though differing) levels of 
autonomy, actors – both public and private – are interdependent (Black, 2002). And these actor 
relationships, which are often symbiotic, are not always bounded by jurisdiction. As such, 
regulation is increasingly performed as a multi-directional, iterative interaction between actors, 
some of whom may sit out-with a jurisdiction. No single actor has ready access to all the 
information necessary to make informed decisions, nor the authority to direct all of the (other) 
actors in the field toward optimal outcomes (as defined by that body). Indeed, many may not 
even be aware of all the regulation that bears on the broad undertaking that comprises a 
particular field. Ultimately, each actor introduces problems/needs and each actor has capacities 
and potential solutions, and in this ‘messy’ way regulation is co-produced (Black, Lodge, 
Thatcher, 2005). 
 All of this means that the environment in which decision-making and/or behaviour-
shaping authority is exercised is spread amongst actors of very different kinds with varying 
perspectives, some of whom will have very limited remits and diverging agendas. In both the 
biotechnology and healthcare contexts (both of which rely on innovation), the most common 
and widely shared objectives (or desired policy outcomes) are to (Hood et al., 2001): 
 
1. develop products that are safe, effective, and supportive of improved individual and public 
health outcomes; 
 
2.  stimulate inventiveness and growth, particularly in the life science and health sectors; 
 
3. create institutional functions that are flexible enough to accommodate sectoral evolution 
                                            
7  That case involved a patent claim on a genetically modified, oil-eating bacterium. The US Patents and 
Trademarks Office (USPTO) rejected the claim on the basis that subject matter (a living organism) was a discovery, 
not an invention. The Court reversed that ruling and granted the patent, thereby establishing the practice of 
making very broad patent claims which positively encouraged investment (Merges and Nelson, 1994). 
5 
 
without admitting of substantial practice gaps; 
 
These objectives are usually achieved through the following regulatory actions, many of which 
will have some foundation in legal instruments: 
 
1. standard-setting (establishing permissions and constraints to encourage preferred social 
states); 
 
2. information-gathering and/or monitoring (producing knowledge about the existing or 
evolving state of play); and 
 
3. behaviour-modification (changing the state of reality by changing the way relevant 
stakeholders act through incentives and/or sanctions). 
 
However, as a result of the expansion, transformation and intensification of the risks associated 
with the biosciences (a claim often tied to the increased power of their interventions into the 
human body and the environment, and the effect these interventions can have on personal 
identity, social relations, habitat, climate, and production), their regulation has become 
extremely politicised. Demands from different actors, which are sometimes almost 
diametrically opposed (e.g., some desire enhanced research freedom and actor autonomy, 
while others demand strict prohibitions and clear boundaries), mean that clashes are 
experienced over what research streams should be publicly funded or even permitted. In this 
regard, the policy debates that both preceded and followed the adoption of the EU 
Biotechnology Patenting Directive, for example, are instructive (Harmon, 2006; Harmon, Laurie, 
Courtney, 2012). 
 The result is that concerns abound about the regulatory regimes that prevail and about 
their effect on both the bioeconomies and the healthcare services that are emerging. The form, 
scope, and stringency of regulation, and the actors who have had a hand in making it, have 
been much discussed and much maligned, most particularly in developed countries like the UK 
and USA. Many regulatory efforts, particularly the top-down command-and-control ones, have 
been reactionary (Laurie and Harmon, 2014), and have therefore fallen short of delivering all 
that might be expected of ‘good regulation’. The unfortunate consequence is that regulatory 
efforts have been cumulative and non-integrated, thereby complicating rather than elucidating 
innovation systems and product pathways. A common outcome is that innovation is not 
facilitated, an shortcoming that is exacerbated by changing regulator attitudes and behaviours 
(Wolf and Delgado, 2003; Schellekens and Moors, 2010).8 Some widely agreed criticisms of 
bioscience regulation include the following: 
 
 There is too much regulation, resulting in ‘regulation overdose’ (Espein, 2006) or ‘over-
regulation’ (Havinghurst and Richman, 2006). 
                                            
8  With respect to changing attitudes and behaviours, note that both the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA) have gradually shifted from being post R&D evidence evaluators to 
active participants in the scientific process. 
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 There are excessive documentary demands made by regulation, resulting in increased 
service delivery costs (Curtis and Schulman, 2006).9 
 
 There are unanticipated (but anticipatable) and sometimes irreconcilable conflicts with 
respect to mandated standards and socio-political expectations caused by regulatory 
interventions in one area (or in one aspect of innovation), resulting in uncertainty and 
duplication of effort (PWC, 2002; Reed et al., 2006; Munos, 2009; Schellekens and Moors, 
2010). 
 
 There are regulatory barriers to ‘out-of-the-box’ or ‘blue sky’ thinking, which stifles 
creativity and therefore prevents disruptive technological improvements (Curtis and 
Schulman, 2006).10 
 
To these we might add the observation that, as technologies evolve, regulation (especially 
specialised or highly specific or targeted regulation) quickly becomes obsolete, so rules 
designed to protect subjects may develop unintended consequences such as preventing the 
deployment of alternative products. 
As one can imagine, the oft-repeated view is therefore that regulation hampers 
innovation and the development of strong and competitive industries (Zerhouni, 2005; Reed et 
al., 2006; Munos, 2009).  This view combined with risk-based calls for improved or tighter 
regulation has pushed high-income countries to oscillate between tight regulation and 
deregulation (or regulation and reregulation). Of course, while we do not dispute the potential 
of regulation to serve undesirable ends, that is not the whole story, and regulation need not be 
just about barriers, boundaries, and sanctions. Regulation can have many salutary effects, some 
of them surprising, so neglecting to regulate, or deregulating where frameworks already exist, 
is almost never the intelligent way forward. This is a fact that is not always appreciated in either 
jurisdictions with sophisticated (or burdensome) regulatory infrastructures, or in developing 
jurisdictions which emulate those first-movers. 
The case-studies below offer a view on the state of regulation in two different but not 
unrelated sectors from two middle-income or developing jurisdictions. While the sectors and 
jurisdictions are obviously shaped by different actors and cultures, combined they suggest 
                                            
9  A complaint that has been levelled at the FDA since at least the 1970s (Grabowski, Vernon & Thomas, 
1978). 
10  Curtis and Schulman (2006) argue that disruptive innovation is more likely in weakly regulated markets 
because lower standards allow the introduction of experimental products that cannot meet the ‘ideal standards’ 
often erected in more sophisticated regimes, which tend to be more stringent; ‘ideal’ rather than ‘optimal’ 
standards, it is claimed, hamper disruptive innovation. The information and communication technology sector is a 
good example of this. In the last two decades, the lightly regulated ICT sector has experienced much greater 
growth and product (and technical) evolution than the much more heavily regulated life sciences sector, and 
innovations have often emerged from small start-up companies which are able to build resources and upstage 
existing industry players by innovating in ways that challenge the status quo. In short, less burdensome regulation 
has facilitated the entry into the sector of new and dynamic players who have gone on to drive the sector forward. 
By contrast, the life sciences sector is dominated by a relatively small group of multinational companies with the 
capacity to navigate the regulatory forest. See Tait (2007) and Tait et al. (2007). 
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insights as to why regulation may be warranted, and they offer lessons that are useful to others 
acting in these fields, including those in developed or high-income countries. 
 
3.  Case-Studies 
 
 a. Argentina and the GET: Social Values Project 
 
Argentina faces a collection of healthcare innovation challenges, some of them common to 
emerging countries, and some less common. With respect to the former, access to healthcare is 
extremely uneven, healthcare standards are neither uniformly defined nor universally applied, 
researchers struggle for enough funding to be internationally competitive, basic research has 
no explicit domestic boundary-setting regulation, and the boundaries between clinical practice 
and research, and between established therapies and experimental therapies are unclear 
(Arzuaga, 2011). With respect to challenges somewhat more unique for an emerging country, 
Argentina experiences significant medical tourism, and conducts high levels of medical 
research, which might come as little surprise given the strong bioscientific heritage enjoyed by 
Argentina and the generalised esteem to which scientists are held there (Kramer, 1996; 
Stekolschik et al., 2010). Indeed, Argentina aspires to make biomedical research a pillar of 
sustainable development (Declaration of Buenos Aires, 2005; Harmon, 2008). There are now 
some 45 groups, both public and private,11 conducting research in different branches of 
medicine, with a significant number of them undertaking work in regenerative medicine 
(Arzuaga, 2014). GET engaged with key stakeholders in the regenerative medicine setting at a 
time when regenerative medicine was high on the Argentine policy agenda and significant 
effort was being expended in exploring the possibility of regulating this field through a 
command-and-control governmental instrument.12 
 
 b. India and the MDP 
 
In 2008, the global medical device market was valued at US$210 billion, and it has grown at a 
rate of 6% annually since 2000 (WHO, 2010). The US remains the largest consumer of medical 
devices, with a market valued at over US$100 billion, though both the Chinese and Indian 
markets are growing in importance; India’s market is estimated at US$2.75 billion, with growth 
coming from the expanding middle class of 300 million people with disposable income and 
heightened health expectations. The US and EU manufacture the majority of all medical 
devices, and over 70% of the 14,000 devices used in India annually are imported from 
                                            
11  The most prominent research institutions are the Schools of Medicine and Biological Sciences at the 
University of Buenos Aires, the Fleni Institute, the Italian Hospital, the Leloir Foundation, the Favaloro Foundation, 
and the Austral Hospital. 
12  The project ran from 2008-2010. According to the Health Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, the Bills 
introduced in the National Congress from 2005-2010 included the following: Clinical Research with Drugs, Medical 
Devices, Biologics, Gene Therapy and Cell Therapy; Code of Ethics for the Promotion of Medicines (2008); Ethics in 
Health Research: Arrangements; Creation of a National Council on Bioethics; Research, Development, Design, 
Production and Access to Medicines for Children: Arrangements; Legal Regime Applicable Biomedical Research; 
National Bioethics in Research and Health Care in Humans (Pertino and Barousse, 2011). 
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developed countries, especially the USA, despite the fact that there are almost 700 Indian 
device manufacturers (NIPER, 2010; Kamath, 2010). US and EU regulation is aimed primarily at 
limiting and managing risk, and it has had a significant impact on the production and diffusion 
of devices (Foote, 1992). In both cases, regulation addresses risk by categorising devices and 
inquiring after quality and safety through criteria such as degree of invasiveness of the device, 
duration of contact with the patient, affected body system, and local v. systemic effects 
(Kramer et al., 2010; Altensetter, 2010). These standards, combined with the operation of 
product liability and compensation legislation, have been particularly influential (Shah and 
Goyal, 2008). While the two regulatory regimes differ in a range of respects (e.g., the EU 
system, it has been argued, gives the manufacturer primary responsibility over quality, safety, 
and efficacy in most circumstances, which, in turn, has led to faster approvals (Ramchandran, 
2004), but which has been blamed for an erosion of protection of the public interest due to 
conflicts of interest and lack of transparency (Kramer at el., 2010)), they demonstrate how 
regulatory systems must serve multiple ends if they are to be effective. The MDP was intended 
to trace the development of medical device innovation in India and explore the consequences 
of the regulatory choices that have been made. 
 
 c. Common Methods and Joint Questions 
 
In both case-studies, semi-structured qualitative interviews lasting from 50 to 90 minutes were 
undertaken, dependent on the participant’s availability. For the most part, open-ended 
questions and a relatively informal interview schedule were used to encourage participants to 
speak in their own words about their experiences, observations, opinions, and desires. 
Nonetheless, some structure was observed insofar as the investigators ensured a consideration 
of certain broad topics, and topics were consistently broached in the same order, unless a 
particular exchange intervened to make an issue’s immediate exploration more 
appropriate/convenient. While both case-studies capture important new evidence pertaining to 
their subject fields, the opinions of the broader (lay) public were not solicited and the data 
generated cannot be said to represent either the ‘Argentine’ or the ‘Indian’ view. 
 In GET, those originally viewed as most likely to influence the nature and content of 
bioscience and stem cell research regulation were targeted. Twenty-two respondents falling in 
two broad categories took part. Approximately half were regenerative medicine clinicians 
and/or researchers, many of whom also held policy advising positions, and the other half were 
national regulators, jurists, and politicians, many of them either scientifically or legally trained. 
The MDP engaged with four medium-sized firms involved in developing products such as heart 
valves, orthopaedic implants, and blood bags, and the Sree Chitra Research Institute, which is 
involved in the Indian medical devices sector. Ten semi-structured interviews were undertaken, 
with two interviews per company.  Interviewees were primarily the Head of R&D and the CEO 
or Managing Director of the firm. Interviews were also conducted with a senior journalist and 
industry association president so as to obtain data from other stakeholders. In both case-
studies, the original sample was supplemented by further participants through a snowball 
technique reliant on the social/professional contacts of the original sample. 
 The transcripts and interviewer notes were (separately) coded and analysed for 
emergent themes informed in part by innovation systems literature, and then the findings of 
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each case-study were compared with respect to their engagement with the following 
questions: 
 
1. In what ways are the prevailing regulatory frameworks deficient (having reference to the 
regulatory objectives and actions mentioned above)? 
 
2. What are the perceived consequences of these deficiencies for stakeholders on the ground, 
most notably researchers/innovators and patients? 
 
3. What values and/or aspects of practice should be included in regulation? 
 
The engagement of these questions with the combined data provide the case-studies with a 
broader base for saying something about the regulation of life sciences and their markets in 
emerging jurisdictions, and the following analysis is structured to highlight shared insights and 
points of comparison. Quotes used were chosen as representative of the evidence on the 
particular issue explored. 
 
4. Findings 
 
 a. Deficiencies in Objectives 
 
Regulation should have clear objectives, and the most common ones in the broad healthcare 
setting are to develop practices and products that are safe, effective, and supportive of 
improved individual and public health outcomes, stimulate inventiveness and growth, and erect 
institutional modes that are flexible enough to accommodate sectoral evolution. Regulatory 
actions to realise these objectives include standard-setting (establishing permissions and 
constraints), information-gathering (monitoring), and behaviour-modification (through 
incentives and/or sanctions). We concede that the rational and balanced pursuit of these aims 
in high-income countries is curiously rare, and this is especially so in the biosciences where 
existing regulation often represents either knee-jerk responses to specific incidents that have 
exorcised the public,13 or over-reliance on the narrow perspective and ambitions of very few 
the interested stakeholders.14 While regulatory capacities might exist, they are not uniformly 
exercised, and they are often spread across multiple bodies, leading to inaccurate 
understandings of the state of affairs and inefficiencies in responding to developments. How 
have Argentina and India faired? 
 
  i. Regenerative Medicine in Argentina 
 
The Argentine regulatory framework applicable to health research and healthcare is a mosaic of 
general legislation and more specific administrative rules issued by the Ministry of Health 
(MOH) and its regulatory agencies. However, the rise of regenerative medicine – and the 
                                            
13  An allegation levelled against the adoption of the Human Tissue Act 2004 in the UK. 
14  An allegation levelled against medicinal products regimes in relation to the pharmaceutical industry. 
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proliferation of difficult-to-categorise cellular therapies – prompted the adoption of a host of 
new regulatory instruments. 
 First, Executive Decree 200/1997 was issued. Aimed at defending human dignity and 
controlling activities associated with cloning, Decree 200/1997 merely states that ‘all cloning 
experiments related to humans are prohibited’. It is silent on all other matters relating to 
regenerative medicine, and it makes no provision for monitoring the field or sanctioning those 
in breach. As such, while its one objective is clear (prohibition of reproductive cloning), it 
provides no substantive guidance guidance or measures for enforcement. 
 Of greater significance is the Transplant Act 1993,15 which establishes the Central 
Institute for Ablation and Implantation (INCUCAI) to oversee the transplantation into humans of 
whole organs and of hematopoietic progenitor cells (from bone marrow and from umbilical 
cord and placental blood).16 MOH Regulatory Decree 512/1995 states that any practice 
involving implantation of non-hematopoietic progenitor cells into humans is an ‘experimental 
practice’ until it is established that it is safe and effective. In 2007, the MOH issued Resolution 
610/2007, which recognises INCUCAI’s competence to deal with activities related to the use of 
human cells for implantation in humans, thereby empowering INCUCAI to regulate regenerative 
medicine more broadly (i.e., to regulate cellular research and therapies outside the 
hematopoietic progenitor cells context). 
 In response to this, INCUCAI issued Resolution 119/2012, which establishes technical 
standards and procedures for the collection, processing, storage, distribution, and 
transportation of cellular products, the aim being to ensure the purity, safety, and efficacy of 
such products through erection of uniform procedures and controls for laboratories and 
production centres operating in the field. Preparations are classified on the basis of levels of 
manipulation, and both measures for handling and prescribed uses are set according to risk 
(with clinical uses categorised as ‘advanced manipulation’ and therefore higher risk). Standards 
are enforced through technical inspections carried out by INCUCAI, but it can only act in respect 
of institutions under national control; it must otherwise act through local health authorities. 
This, and the fact that only a few protocols have been filed with INCUCAI since 2007 have 
rendered its standards nugatory. 
                                            
15  Organs and Human Anatomic Material Transplantation Act, Law 24.193, of 24 March 1993, modified by 
Act 26.066. 
16  Use of such cells has increased dramatically, which prompted the adoption of the National Donor Registry 
for Hematopoietic Progenitor Cells Act 2001, Law 25.392, by the National Congress and a host of regulations by 
INCUCAI. For example, INCUCAI Resolution 082/2000 adopts rules for healthcare facilities and professionals 
intending to collect, cryopreserve, and transplant hematopoietic progenitor cells so as to ensure adequate 
therapeutic results. INCUCAI Resolution 129/2003 establishes the criteria for the qualification of facilities and 
teams performing infusion of live unrelated donors. INCUCAI Resolutions 116/2004 and 7700/2004 establish 
search processes and special procedures so that Argentine patients needing such transplants could search sources 
out-with Argentina. INCUCAI Resolution 319/2004 establishes rules for banks sourcing hematopoietic progenitor 
cells from umbilical cords and placentas. INCUCAI Resolution 52/2006 establishes the tariff values for billing 
procedures for searching international records of unrelated donor. INCUCAI Resolution 309/2007 classifies 
different uses of hematopoietic progenitor cells based on clinical indications for purposes of characterising them as 
‘standard practice’ (and so outside the ‘experimental practice’ rules). INCUCAI Resolution 069/2009 regulates the 
activity of cord blood banks and the use of cord- and placenta-derived tissue for possible autologous use (i.e., use 
of the child who was the subject of the pregnancy), addressing collection, processing, storage, research, shipping, 
and transplantation, and penalties for breach. 
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 In Argentina, medicinal products are governed by the Medicines Act 1964.17 Article 1 
states that the Act governs the importation, exportation, production, manufacture, processing, 
commercialisation, and interprovincial trade of drugs, chemicals, reagents, pharmaceutical 
forms, medications, diagnostics, and other products used for application in human medicine. It 
sets standards to ensure the quality and safety of medicinal products authorised for human 
consumption, erecting civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance (Agosti, 2003).18 Given 
that regenerative medicine therapies do not neatly fit into existing legislative categories, the 
MOH tried to establish a registry for cellular therapies through the National Administration of 
Drugs, Food and Medical Technology (ANMAT). ANMAT Resolution 7075/2011 defines 
‘biological medicinal products’ as products derived from living organisms or their tissues, and so 
categorises cellular therapies as Advanced Therapeutic Medicinal Products (ATMPs), which, 
under ANMAT Resolution 7729/2011, must be registered with the National Drugs Registry for 
approval for use in humans under the existing regime. 
 Of a more general character, the MOH issued Resolution 1490/2007, which is intended 
to standardise activities related to clinical trials in humans to ensure respect for ethical values 
and human rights. Addressing (1) principles of good clinical practice, (2) research ethics 
committees, (3) responsibilities of researchers, (4) responsibilities of sponsors, and (5) use of 
protocols, it draws on the Nuremberg Code (1949), the Helsinki Declaration (2004), CIOMS 
Guidelines for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (2002), and other international 
instruments. In 2011, the MOH reviewed Resolution 1490/2007 and, through Resolution 
1480/2011, extended its scope to all research on human health, creating the National Register 
of Health Research in the process, a system aimed at consolidating information and facilitating 
public access to that information (Arzuaga, 2012). 
 Despite considerable regulatory construction, much of it in response to the specific 
challenges of regenerative medicine, Argentina’s system remains sub-optimal. It is surely 
(appropriately) aimed at developing products that are safe, effective, and supportive of 
improved health, and also at stimulating innovation and growth, two of the three core 
objectives identified. Additionally, it has (laudably) set standards informed by respected 
international instruments, established some limited means of information-gathering through its 
registries, and extended behaviour-modifying sanctioning to its agencies. However, much of the 
reform has comprised ad hoc alterations to the duties of existing agencies and the adoption of 
additional legal instruments, leading to the regulatory complexity and actor burden that is so 
much maligned. And despite this accumulation, significant regulatory gaps persist (Harmon, 
2008; Harmon, 2011). 
 For example, Argentina is still without universally applicable standards; INCUCAI and 
ANMAT (whose expertise and the effectiveness of their enforcement mechanisms have been 
questioned (Arzuaga, 2012) have limited reach into the provinces, which have primary 
jurisdiction over health, but also a distinct inequality in both financial capacity and attention to 
                                            
17  Commercialization Regime of Medicinal Products Act, Law 16.463, of 8 August 1964, and Decree 
9763/1964. 
18  Again, where medicinal products are not intended for interprovincial transit, import, or export, provincial 
medicines legislation applies. 
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research and healthcare demands.19 Consider ANMAT Resolution 7075/2011, Article 3 of which 
excludes from its remit biological products made entirely by a specialised centre licensed by a 
competent health authority to be used in and by that centre under the conditions that the 
authority has determined. The fact that cellular therapies made and used within a single 
institution need not be recorded, and will be unscrutinised by either INCUCAI or ANMAT (and 
so will not be subject to the principles and standards they have erected) have led to suggestions 
that this lends the administration of unproven cellular treatments some semblance of legality 
(Bergel, 2009; Arzuaga, 2012). Ultimately, significant research and most clinical applications of 
regenerative medicine fall outside the regulatory framework and are invisible to any formal or 
effective oversight.20 
 
  ii. Medical Devices in India 
 
Originally, and for a long time, India’s MDI suffered from regulatory neglect. The consequences 
of this were threefold: 
 
 Ignorance: There was little reliable information on device function and performance 
available to healthcare authorities or practitioners. The only available information was 
manufacturer marketing propaganda. Devices were sold without any monitoring by 
authorities or reporting by hospitals.21 
 
 Variable Quality: Lack of oversight opened the door for spurious local operators flogging 
low-quality goods or counterfeit devices made from scrap material. Small trading 
companies importing from China, Korea, and Taiwan mushroomed. One respondent in the 
MDP, a CEO of an orthopaedic implants company, reported that his company lost more 
business to these spurious traders and counterfeit manufactures than to multinational 
corporations. Even well-known foreign multinationals would ‘dump’ devices in the Indian 
market. For example, in 2004 the state-run JJ Hospital in Mumbai used Axxion drug eluting 
stents manufactured by Netherlands-based Occam despite those stents not having been 
approved for use in the Netherlands. After patients were harmed by the devices, the 
government shut down both the Mumbai-based importer and a local stent company, the 
latter who initiated a judicial review of the decision in an effort to showcase the absence of 
rules (Magotra, 2006). Even when legitimate and conscientious domestic manufacturers 
                                            
19  Regulation exists in some provinces, although approaches vary between legislation and administrative 
rules. The provinces that have legislated are Córdoba, Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires Province, Tucuman, Neuquén, 
Rio Negro. Provinces that have issued administrative rules are Mendoza and Jujuy. 
20  Quite aside from this, there is a very strong argument to be made that regenerative medicine research 
and cellular therapies deserve their own sui generis regulatory framework with experts to manage it. Thus, instead 
of two frameworks relevant to healthcare research – medical devices and small molecule pharmaceuticals – there 
would be three, thereby allowing them to be tailored to the very different mechanisms on which they rely and the 
very different challenges and risks they represent. Such specialisation of frameworks would allow better flexibility 
within them to more seamlessly keep up with technological innovation. 
21  Thus, for example, when Boston Scientific and Johnson & Johnson withdrew their stents worldwide in 
2004, there was no information available in India on how many of these devices had been used or how many 
adverse events had been reported (Harper, 2003). 
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entered the market, an absence of uniform quality and performance standards meant that 
they had nothing to work toward, which contributed further to variable quality, and 
hampered entry of Indian manufacturers into international markets.  
 
 Predatory Pricing: As the clinical community became more averse to using Indian devices, 
multinationals, who offered no evidence of their production costs, were able to charge 
high prices for their more stringently regulated and reliable products. Of the more than 
11,000 valve procedures performed annually in India since 1994, only 1,000 valves 
developed by Sri Chitra Research Institute (a leading Indian institute) were used even 
though they cost less than 50% of the average imported valves (Murthy, 2004). One 
respondent in the MDP, a leading cardiovascular surgeon, admitted to be compelled to 
import 90% of the high-end devices for his hospitals at high cost and to replace them every 
3-5 years at still higher cost, both of which push up the cost of specialised care making 
them inaccessible to about one billion patients. 
 
The above-mentioned JJ Hospital case resulted in the High Court ordering the government to 
set standards for the import, manufacture, sale, and distribution of devices. In response, the 
government amended the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 (D&C Act) and the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Rules 1945 (Rules) to cover ten specific medical devices. The primary objective of the 
D&C Act, which is administered and enforced by the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI) 
and the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisations (CDSCO), is to promote safe and effective 
healthcare by regulating the import, export, manufacture, distribution, and sale of drugs, 
cosmetics, and (now) devices. 
 The D&C Act now covers specified devices intended for internal or external use in the 
diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease or disorder in human beings or 
animals (although no generalised risk classification is erected). It establishes a structure that 
contains control points at the levels of market, manufacturer, and healthcare institution. 
Although authority is shared with state Licensing Authorities (responsible for monitoring drugs 
and devices moving in the market), and state Inspectors (responsible for market surveillance by 
drawing samples from retailers, hospitals, and manufacturers), the CDSCO is responsible for 
overseeing medical device and diagnostics firms and for disseminating information on 
registered devices and drugs, licensed distributors, and compliance. Imported devices must be 
approved for sale in the country of manufacture, and importers can can rely on US, EU, 
Japanese, Canadian and Australian approvals for proof of quality, safety and efficacy (i.e., this 
fast-tracks device approval). Where no such registration exists (such as when the device is 
domestically manufactured), the device must receive an ISI Mark from the Bureau of Indian 
Standards. Schedule ‘M’ of the D&C Act articulates good manufacturing practices, and specifies 
requirements for premises, equipment, personnel, storage, documentation, etc. Manufacturers 
are required to comply with Schedule ‘M’ under the conditions of their license. 
 Patients, healthcare providers, and domestic device manufacturers are all expected to 
benefit from these amendments, which should, it is assumed, make it difficult for 
counterfeiters and low-quality importers. They also benefit from the clarity offered by the 
guidelines for authorisation of devices, and this, it is felt, creates the opportunity to develop 
devices that can compete with products from foreign multi-national corporations. 
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 b. Consequences on the Ground 
 
The above demonstrates that, while not necessarily optimally arrived at, the Argentine and 
Indian frameworks do articulate to some degree the baseline objectives one would hope and 
expect to see in the health context. That is, their genesis is in concerns for patient safety and 
the provision of effective healthcare, and, additionally, for domestic technical innovation and 
economic growth (admittedly not comfortable bedfellows). Flexibility has not been a key 
feature of either regime. However, reform efforts have introduced some responsiveness to 
changing circumstances. So how well have they achieved their objectives? 
 
  i. Risk and Exposure in Argentina 
 
GET exposed evidence that the complex of regulatory instruments comprising the Argentine 
regenerative medicine framework is failing to achieve two highly valued objectives: 
 
 realisation of safe and effective science and healthcare; and 
 encouragement of scientific innovation and economic growth. 
 
Importantly, it was not felt that these objectives are disregarded by the framework or those 
administering it, but rather that not enough attention has been paid to achieving them through 
rationally connected measures. In short, it wasn’t an absence of salutary objectives that 
rendered the framework ineffective, but rather an absence of any truly effective modes of 
operation (e.g., articulation of standards, monitoring of conduct, and authority to change 
behaviour). 
First, and most importantly, it was felt by most respondents that the framework, 
considered holistically, had little chance of effectively encouraging (much less realising or 
imposing) safe healthcare, or rather the honest and good-faith delivery of proven and effective 
clinical tools and practices. Many respondents opined that the general lack of systematic 
monitoring of either scientific or clinical practices meant that improper practices went 
unidentified, and where they were known or suspected, they went unchallenged and 
unpunished with the result that patients were vulnerable to a variety of harms resultant from 
acceptance of poor interventions administered by questionably motivated professionals. While 
it would take a bold (and misinformed) person to suggest that regulation guarantees ‘good 
science’ or ‘good clinical practice’, and while it was acknowledged (at least by some) that 
consistently achieving these requires systemic approaches, it was generally held that regulation 
is one of the most important elements of discouraging ‘bad science’ and ‘bad clinical practice’ 
(eg: falsifying results, fraudulent behaviour, improper claims about the utility of interventions, 
administering highly experimental treatments). 
For example, respondents identified ample scope for actors to behave in ways 
detrimental not only to patient safety but additionally to the scientific undertaking. R5, a stem 
cell researcher, observed that clinical trials have been undertaken (and published in 
international journals) without the consent of authorities as mandated by MOH rules, and an 
absence of monitoring leaves such breaches unrectified: 
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So the scientific community should be much more strict on asking, for example, 
for the authorisation to do the clinical trial … because if that paper gets 
published then, for us in Argentina, it is more difficult to tell the patient, ‘This 
clinic is doing something wrong’.  Because the clinic then shows the scientific 
paper saying this clinical trial is validated. 
 
Thus, this respondent felt that more comprehensive coordination is warranted. R6, a public 
health physician and policy advisor, stated: 
 
You have problems in the academic institutions [and] with ethics committees. 
... Then you have problems with investigators. I [know an] Argentinean 
investigator, he knows nothing about the international regulations. 
 
R19 added: 
 
You know that we have some places in Argentina – like St Nicholas in the 
province of Buenos Aries – that are using cellular therapies for everything. And 
that is, they have protocols that … don’t have the approval of the Ministry of 
Health, and they don’t have the approval of INCUCAI. And they publish papers 
in the international level, because, I don’t know why, because … in the paper 
they have the [assent of the] institutional review boards in their institution. 
And so they have the informed consent of the patient because the patient is 
blind. And of course, the journals accept the papers. 
 
In short, respondents acknowledged the risks to patients associated with this research and the 
application of its outcomes, and considered government regulation to be an important but 
currently absent shaper of behaviour and guarantor of quality. The prevailing situation 
permitted actors to behave according to their own values and interests, which did not always 
support the realisation of public goods. From a scientific perspective, they contributed nothing 
to knowledge, which undermines the justification for research, and from a healthcare 
perspective they offered no demonstrable clinical effect for patient, or, worse, distracted 
patients from getting alternate and proven therapies that would have an effect, a scenario 
which destroys the reputation of scientific research and conscientious healthcare providers. 
And it has been reported that, despite INCUCAI’s licensing power, unproven stem cell 
treatments continue to be administered (Arzuaga, 2014). 
The second unmet objective was the aim of facilitating science and innovation and 
thereby encouraging not only economic growth, but the growth of knowledge with the 
potential for translation into appropriate clinical interventions. Respondents felt that 
researchers operating in potentially high-impact but also highly politicised fields such as 
regenerative medicine were offered no ‘regulatory cover’. By-and-large, researchers wish to (1) 
pursue their science, and (2) where appropriate, engage with publics around their science and 
its trajectories and potential outcomes. The former is the natural desire that pushes 
researchers to enter and then excel in their chosen field. The latter comes from the realisation 
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(by some) that both public understanding and acceptance of bioscience and its outcomes are 
improved when science is approached democratically, that is pursued in an open and 
participative manner. These values of openness and discursiveness are particularly challenging 
in Argentina because of the perceived antagonism of certain institutions toward science 
generally and regenerative medicine more specifically. One institution is the Catholic Church. 
While there is a risk of broad-brushing away the diversity of opinions toward science 
within the Church, it can be said that it has acted suspicious of, and resistant to, many aspects 
and aspirations of regenerative medicine (Macklin and Luna, 1996; Acreo, 2006; Luna and 
Salles, 2010). This view was widely held by respondents, many of whom viewed the Church, or 
at least its formal, public positions, as antagonistic. They felt that rigid Church positions and 
dogma made it impossible to have reasoned and rational public discourses on almost any 
aspect of regenerative medicine. One respondent, R4, a stem cell researcher, said: 
 
[Y]ou will see that the debates [about] abortion; there are still people who are 
against abortion and they go to the hospital and try to convince very poor 
people that they shouldn’t abort. It is the claim that God and angels will come 
and will lead them. I don’t know. There is still a lot of work to do. 
 
With respect to stem cell research related dialogues, R16, a physician, stated: 
 
Just within the specific scientific community. In that group we agree this kind of 
research is important, but there is a problem in Argentina with religion. … 
People are confused, confused ideas from church [about] science. … 
 
R19, a physician, health administrator, and policy advisor, noted: 
 
I am sure that if we put the [issue of embryonic stem cell research] on the face, 
it’s very probable the Catholic Church would take a position against that. And 
the Church influences, probably not the population, but the politicians. 
 
In settings where powerful institutions are oppositional, or are perceived as such, the science 
culture and the individual researchers’ place within it become negative and embattled. In 
Argentina and similarly polarised environments researchers are confronted with challenges and 
concerns that are not necessarily experienced to a comparable degree by colleagues in 
competing and collaborating jurisdictions. Many of the respondents harboured serious 
concerns over such basic matters as their ‘freedom to research’, which they felt was 
jeopardised by working openly or by publicising their work. This perceived need to conduct 
science ‘behind closed doors’ was articulated by R14, a lawyer, who stated that scientists 
remain reluctant to announce their findings to the people and that this reluctance means that 
people form decisions about science (and healthcare interventions) based on partial evidence; 
the scientific voice is not heard so people sometimes form false impressions. R15, an academic 
scholar and bioethicist, stated: 
 
There [was] some buzz … when the Obama position about accepting research 
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with stem cells was brought up by the [Advisory Commission on Regenerative 
Medicine and Cellular Therapies], but it’s more like isolated voices. I think that 
behind the scenes, the root of the problem is the position of the Catholic 
Church. And that’s why everybody tries to be cautious about what they say and 
how to deal with this issue. ... It is like everybody is afraid of the Church … . And 
so people that are doing assisted reproduction will save embryos and they will 
not destroy embryos and they will not accept that they do anything. … And 
even the abortions that are accepted by law, they are not performed. … I think 
there is really a silence about it. … The researchers are not saying anything.  We 
have really high quality centres for assisted reproduction, and people come to 
Argentina to do these treatments because they are cheap and very good. But at 
the same time, nobody will accept what they are doing. … [N]obody is willing to 
go upfront and say, ‘Well, we do this because it is important,’ and it is difficult 
continuing to work with embryos. 
 
This position was echoed by a member of the Advisory Commission on Regenerative Medicine 
and Cellular Therapies, who stated that the Commission tried to encourage an open debate on 
stem cell research in 2007/08, but many stakeholders were reluctant to engage because of 
concerns about negative attention. 
The Argentine researchers who participated in GET wish to be more open in the pursuit 
of their science. R2, a researcher and regulator, stated that ‘proper scientists’ are tired of 
listening to the claims of those who are working unethically, and would like to have better and 
safer opportunities to clarify the situation. R16 reiterated this, stating that attendees at 
doctors’ meetings claimed that they would like to work in regenerative medicine with more 
contact with supportive organisations. As it stands, and due to the weaknesses of the 
regulatory framework, stakeholders are not comfortable exposing their research or announcing 
their findings publicly because of anticipated reactions from institutions like the Church, and 
because of potential reactions from publics labouring under misunderstandings of science 
which are, at least in part, encouraged by the Church. 
In summary, the Argentine regulatory framework fails to achieve two of its primary 
objectives, namely to promote patient safety and to encourage locally useful scientific 
innovation. Respondents in GET viewed the prevailing framework as unfit insofar as it exposed 
the two stakeholder groups considered to be most in need of protection (patients and 
researchers) to multiple risks of harm; it failed to protect patients, who are exposed to 
inappropriate risks by inadequately scrutinised and often experimental procedures, and it failed 
to protect researchers, who are demonised by antagonistic interest groups. The consequence 
was the perpetuation of poor scientific practices and the gagging of ethical researchers. 
 
  ii. Confusion and Incompetency in India 
 
The Indian government had two primary objectives in amending D&C Act, namely to promote 
accessibility to safe and effective devices for the local population, and to protect ‘above-board’ 
domestic manufacturers by creating a framework for notified devices. However, it has struggled 
to achieve these objectives on the ground, in part because of the deficiencies in the regime 
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created, which is (1) inappropriately aligned, (2) under-inclusive, (3) lacking in effective 
monitoring. 
 The regime is inappropriately aligned insofar as it forms part of an existing framework 
which was designed for very different technologies, namely medicinal products 
(pharmaceuticals), which are different in nature, action on the body, and packaging. For 
example, ‘sterility’ differs in meaning between medicinal products and medical devices; drug 
manufacturing requires ‘clean room conditions’ (necessitating certain flooring, air-flow, and 
energy deployment) whereas medical devices are often sterilised at the point of use. One 
respondent in the MDP, a leading manufacturer of diagnostic devices, complained: 
 
This industry is considered to be a pharma segment but really does not belong 
there. The authorities themselves are not knowledgeable about [the] 
diagnostics industry. A device cannot be regulated as a drug. 
 
Improper fit of concepts has led to interpretational confusion and the introduction into the 
market of devices varying wildly in quality (WHO, 2012). 
 Another key shortcoming is that the new provisions cover a small spectrum of specified 
devices only, ignoring the vast majority of devices on the market. Non-sterile devices, for 
example, which remain freely importable and sellable in India, are completely invisible to the 
regulatory framework. This under-inclusiveness has, again, permitted counterfeit and dubious 
quality devices into the market. 
 A third critical failing is that relating to the failure to erect a monitoring system for 
recalled devices. All medical devices carry a certain degree of risk and have potential to cause 
harm in unforeseen circumstances.  If defects are detected during regular use or routine quality 
inspections, then manufacturers recall the product so as to avoid serious health problems for 
patients. Foreign multi-national corporations routinely recall products, and with more than 70% 
of devices in India being imported, the failure to assign responsibility for ensuring that recalled 
devices do not remain in active use is a major flaw. Risk assessments and recall vigilance are left 
to healthcare professionals, or to the honesty of manufacturers to pull defective stock of the 
market. 
 In addition, the new regime was accompanied by significant uncertainty about its 
interpretation. Prior to issuance of the MOH’s Implementing Guidelines, manufacturers had 
very little indication of how the regime would be administered. Uncertainty led customs 
authorities to hold shipments, which created a shortfall of devices and debate on their legal 
status and inclusion in the D&C Act. Once the Implementing Guidelines were issued in 2006, 
they suffered from inconsistent interpretation by different regulatory authorities (e.g., customs 
officials, state drug controllers, CDSCO officials, etc.). State involvement has led to 
discrepancies in administration between central authorities and states and indeed between 
states. Some suppliers waited over 7 months for licenses, even for products that had been in 
the market for more than 20 years and had received regulatory approval in Europe (Kamath, 
2007). Additionally, there is a dearth of qualified engineers to head central and state testing 
laboratories, which has led to mistakes and complaints about quality. A leading manufacturer of 
diagnostic devices points out: 
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More than 95% of the quality complaints are due to procedural mistakes. We 
noticed that the same kits perform very well in the export markets, but get 
complaints from the domestic market. This gives a major problem for the 
manufacturers, particularly newer companies. 
 
All of the above has made the Indian clinical persist in its hesitancy to use Indian devices; thus, 
rather than empowering and legitimating domestic manufacturers, the D&C Act is endangering 
them. The prominent view is that ‘optimal regulation’ requires a bespoke regulatory body for 
devices.22 The Indian Medical Regulatory Authority is now intending to create a two-tiered 
system reliant on third-party conformity assessments through a number of notified bodies 
analogous to that adopted by the EU (Ramchandran, 2004), but suspicion and poor 
communication between departments combined with severe infrastructural problems have 
hindered regulatory development (as well as implementation of existing rules). 
 In summary, the Indian regulatory framework fails to achieve two of its core objectives, 
namely to promote patient safety and encourage local innovation and competitiveness. The 
original regulatory lacunae did nothing to protect patients from injury stemming from devices, 
particularly counterfeit devices, and the court-imposed bolt-on system has done little better. 
Local actors still struggle to gain the trust of health authorities, practitioners, and patients, and 
the government struggles with how to set up a framework that properly distinguishes between 
medical devices and medicinal products. 
 
 c. Elements of Good Regulation 
 
Despite the stark failures of governmental interventions to date, respondents in both GET and 
the MDP recognised the value of a clear, standards-based, top-down regulatory framework, 
and most expressed a desire for such a command-and-control instrument. In GET, R10, a legal-
ethical academic, stated: 
 
I think that you need to regulate because the power and possibilities in the 
scientific field are so much, and the possible effects are so terrible … . With a lot of 
care … and consulting specialists, something must be done. 
 
In the MDP, a chairman of a diagnostic firm stated: 
 
I welcome the regulatory system in the medical device market. Laboratories and 
manufacturers should validate for performance of the product and capability of 
the technical staff. It will help us to weed out unscrupulous sub-standard devices. 
 
In particular, respondents wanted something that set boundaries, helped to dissuade ‘bad’ 
operators, and sent unambiguous messages to publics. On the former, in GET, R2, a regulator, 
                                            
22  As for a process of establishing what ‘optimal’ means, the process adopted by Argentina from 2008-2012 
in the regenerative medicines context is a useful model. For an elaboration of this process, see Laurie, Harmon & 
Arzuaga (2012) and Harmon, Haddow & Laurie (2013). 
20 
 
suggested that regulation must facilitate science while demarcating forbidden pursuits and 
practices. R12, a federal judge, opined that good regulation which encourages useful outcomes 
would be helpful. In the MDP, the head of medical device firm suggested as follows: 
 
It is essential that India enact medical device law soon. This would ensure that 
only products conforming to international standards are made. Counterfeit 
manufacturers will be prevented from marketing spurious, untested products in 
unfair competition with authentic manufacturers.  
 
Some respondents suggested that new regulation might lead to a 5-10% increase in the cost of 
devices, but will be more beneficial in the long-term as patients will trust locally manufactured 
devices that are certified. 
 On the related issue of messages sent through regulation, there was a high degree of 
symmetry in the case-studies. Core propositions can be summarised as follows: 
 
 Regenerative medicine is, in the usual course and where appropriately reviewed and 
conducted, ethically defensible, publicly supportable, and internationally competent. 
 
 Indian devices are, in the usual course and where appropriately developed and tested, 
ethically defensible, publicly supportable, and internationally competitive. 
 
In short, they want some formal framework with a legitimating effect, for this, it was perceived, 
will serve a trust-building function (as between the public and scientists/innovators) that will 
promote greater transparency, an improved working culture, and improved science/innovation. 
 But what are some of the key values or elements that were considered essential for 
good governance? Again, we see similarities in the evidence, for respondents in both case-
studies identified ‘transparency’ and ‘innovation’ not only as substantive regulatory objectives, 
but as key elements of the regulatory frameworks. What might these concepts mean for these 
jurisdictions and beyond? 
 
  i. Transparency and Innovation in Argentina 
 
Respondents in GET were concerned that those operating in health innovation and healthcare 
should be ‘transparent’, a recurring value which had several overlapping components, including 
honesty and engagement. All respondents thought that stakeholders must be scrupulously 
honest with the public and with patients, and they shared a concern that too many people are 
being led to believe that stem cells, for example, will work through some magic to cure all their 
ills. R1, a scientist and regulator, acknowledged that too many people lie, promising both 
patients and regulators one thing and doing something else. In his governance capacity, he 
reported seeing occasions where researchers take tissue from people for purposes outside their 
approved protocol. R3, a stem cell scientist, stated that dishonesty is “the enemy [that] we 
have to fight against.” 
 Linked to these mutually enhancing ideas of transparency and honesty were the joint 
ideas of engagement and interaction. It was felt that innovators must engage more openly and 
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consistently with stakeholders. R5, a researcher and ethicist, stated: 
 
It is very important to open the debate and to have opposite visions of the subject 
sitting at the same table and think that maybe both have rights. That not one has 
the truth and one has not, maybe both have the truth. You need to really conclude 
what is the best for the country and for the people of the country. … The higher 
consequence of good communication … is that you don’t give a [chance] for so-
called doctors to propose therapies that are not validated. 
 
R11, a clinician, stated: 
 
I want social debate about stem cells, but I think this is not currently an agenda of 
the government. … We in society need to think, and to express opinions regarding 
stem cell therapies. 
 
Respondents believed that publics have the right to know the scope and purpose of research, 
the risks, benefits and expectations associated with research, the interests and potential 
conflicts of the researcher(s), and ‘what is behind the research’ (i.e., the source and provenance 
of tissue). Researchers should be called upon to defend and/or explain their work, and they 
should be expected to record and make public their work. 
 Importantly, there was significant agreement that regulation should contain elements 
that ensured transparency (e.g., honest interactions, open debate, publicly accountable 
decision-making). So while both the scientific and healthcare communities need to be more 
careful about what they promise, and researchers need to adopt a more open and participative 
stance regarding the ambitions and direction of science, these changes could, it was felt, be 
facilitated by regulation. Additionally, the regulation itself must be more transparent; it must 
not be too complex so that neither stakeholders nor publics can understand or navigate it. 
 On the matter of ‘innovation’, many of the respondents in GET emphasised the need for 
society to recognise some minimum level of liberty to act (and conduct research) in accordance 
with one’s own feelings and values so long as others were not injured. On this point, R3 echoed 
a lot of respondents with this observation: 
 
In science, you have to have freedom – academic freedom – to go this way or that 
way. This is essential to the scientific community. … [Even for controversial 
science] I would prefer society to say, ‘Well, go ahead and we are going to fund 
this if you work with peer review … from the scientific community and accept this 
common ground. … I tend to think to be open minded and science needs freedom. 
 
R14, a lawyer and ethicist, stated: 
 
If it is true, that God made us, he gave human beings intelligence to research 
medicine, biology, and to improve our situation. So I think it is necessary that 
researchers are given the freedom to develop science. 
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R20, a lawyer and ethicist, acknowledged the need for freedom, but returned to the idea of 
society shaping science: 
 
Sometimes people think that if something can be done it should be done. I think 
that we have to fight that attitude. I do believe that a moral conversation on stem 
cell research is absolutely necessary. I would not say, ‘Yeah you can do it, let’s do 
it,’ without even thinking about it, because … there are too many values and too 
many aspects involved ...  
 
In essence, it was generally felt that social plurality must be explored, but it must not lead to 
the lowest common denominator (or the most blandly palatable science). Researchers have a 
responsibility to take opportunities and to push boundaries, but in the understanding that they 
have duties to society. Those duties include the obligation to rely on, and to generate, good 
evidence thereby encouraging scientific veracity, and to abide by reviewed research protocols 
and internationally informed clinical standards. 
 And again, regulation was felt to have a direct and important role in achieving good 
innovation. One respondent suggested the need to begin with science policies, another 
identified a need to review lab practices, and a third opined that no regulation was better than 
bad regulation, but most agreed that some regulation for science and innovation was 
important. R17, a clinical researcher, stated that regenerative medicine must be regulated: 
 
We can’t work without regulation. And medical doctors can’t work without 
regulation. And it is not good to work without regulation. 
 
The need for boundaries and guidance alluded to here, and its benefit to innovation, was 
echoed by almost all of the respondents, but other benefits were also identified. R15, an 
ethicist, stated: 
 
I think that trying to regulate stem cell research may help also with being more 
honest regarding other issues. … I think it is always better to have some kind of 
regulation, than leaving it like this and everybody free rides. 
  
In summary, transparency and innovation were seen as important social-scientific targets and 
appropriate subjects for regulation, and transparency was additionally seen as an important 
characteristic of regulation. 
 
  ii. Transparency and Innovation in India 
 
As in GET, the MDP identified transparency and innovation as important components and goals 
of the regulatory framework. Many respondents pointed out that regulatory structures and 
conceptions were unclear, in part because of the lack of differentiation between medical 
devices and medicinal products, and they wished for an autonomous, single-level regulator to 
govern the sector (because the existing multiple authorities create confusion). A respondent 
from the Association of Indian Medical Device Industry stated: 
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The government is trying to say that medical devices are different from drugs, but 
this Act continues to regulate devices under the category of drugs. And various 
authorities at centre and inspectors at the state make these things very 
complicated. A single autonomous regulator under the Ministry of Health will be 
good. 
 
Respondents believed that to ensure patient safety it is important to have a regulatory 
framework that engages with manufacturers, vendors, patient groups, local hospitals, and 
international regulatory bodies. There was significant agreement regarding investing in 
education and training programmes for users, and awareness programmes for patient groups. 
One respondent stated: 
 
The key objective is to make sure patients get appropriate treatment. Doctors 
need to be given training on use of devices and patient should be made aware of 
risks and quality standards. 
 
The Indian government appreciates the value of recognising devices as a distinct category, and 
so introduced the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill 2013 in Parliament in 2014. This Bill 
articulates a regime more in line with standard international practices developed by the 
International Medical Device Regulators Forum. However, there remains an issue of 
appropriateness of these provisions for local contexts and their impact on supporting local 
innovations. For example, the Bill defines ‘adulterated devices’ as any device that: 
 
 is composed of rusted, corroded, filthy, putrid or decomposed substances; 
 is packed under unsanitary conditions that would make it hazardous to someone’s health; 
 contains toxic substances. 
 
It then puts responsibility of ‘adulterated devices’ on manufacturers, but it must be recalled 
that devices have a greater chance than drugs for becoming contaminated at the point of use, 
well after the manufacturer has relinquished responsibility. It has been argued: 
 
So even if a user stores a device improperly, it’s the manufacturer who will be held 
liable. That’s not all. The Bill talks about minimum standards for medical devices, 
but doesn’t actually define what these standards are. These devices are pieces of 
science and engineering. You can measure the efficacy of drugs, but not of a 
medical device. The government should measure their performance. Drugs and 
medical devices are two completely separate things. You can’t measure them with 
the same indicators (Nagarajan, 2013). 
 
Many respondents felt that confusion has contributed to lack of transparency and poor 
management, which means that local innovation is still stifled. 
 On the issue of innovation, it was reported that Indian manufacturers are interested in 
incremental improvements and adaptation of devices to local settings, which have distinctive 
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disease profiles dominated by communicable diseases such as malaria and dengue fever. Indian 
manufacturers are thus focused on developing safe, effective, low cost devices. For example, in 
1990, the Sree Chitra Research Institute developed a mechanical heart valve. Developed 
incrementally, it was a simple mechanical design that was much cheaper than foreign imports. 
Respondents suggest that, without proper regulatory support and standards, these and other 
developments will remain unrealised.23 
 A new framework, it was felt, must do two interrelated things. First, it must place the 
concerns of poor patients at the heart of the regulation, taking positive steps to remedy their 
persistent lack of access to appropriate diagnostic and treatment devices. Second, it must 
facilitate local innovation by permitting only legitimate devices to be sold in India, and by 
encouraging trust in local manufacturers. Until this happens does, the ‘above-board’ domestic 
devices industry will continue to struggle despite competing against expensive imports and 
dangerous counterfeits. And to achieve this, consultation with stakeholders (e.g., patient 
groups, surgeons, scientists, entrepreneurs, hospital authorities, etc.) was cited as an important 
step in designing a new framework that adequately represented the interests of all 
stakeholders. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Despite differences in their factual foundation, a number of findings are supported by our 
comparative analysis. First, the ‘do we / don’t we’ debates around regulation in the biosciences 
and biotechnologies sectors are valueless. The risks to both health human and to socially useful 
innovation are too many and too severe to be left unaddressed by regulatory absence, even in 
countries with myriad other and perhaps more pressing social concerns. In other words, leaving 
industry and interested actors to their own devices is not the answer; in the global health and 
innovation settings, markets neither identify nor consistently correct inappropriate behaviour. 
Both GET and the MDP uncovered evidence that, when combined with the absence of 
regulation, the contested nature of an undertaking (regenerative medicine), or the complexity 
of the knowledge necessary for success (devices), or both, can be critical barriers to innovation 
and effective uptake of products and practices. Tied to this, the fallout extends to issues such as 
willingness to invest, development of local technical capability, and ability to plug into global 
structures.  
 Second, the quickly evolving, technology-heavy, and internationally networked sectors 
that are regenerative medicine and medical devices (and to these we might add other health-
related sectors and activities) will struggle to meet reasonable socio-political and industry 
objectives if they are made to rely on a patchwork of existing regulatory instruments, or on 
instruments forged in a reactionary way. The evolution of both sectors in these countries are 
characterised by flawed policies which have informed half-measures or bolt-on instruments to 
existing regimes not at all intended to address them nor adequately provisioned to cope with 
them. Their deficiencies have resulted in them being met with a great deal of dissatisfaction, 
                                            
23  Developments emerging from local technology centres supported by foreign multi-nationals. For 
example, GE and Stryker each have centres in Bangalore while Stryker, Covidien and Johnson & Johnson have 
centres in Gurgaon, Mumbai, and Hyderabad respectively. 
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which can be amplified in emerging countries that have less developed alternative support 
institutions and networks, or smaller and less diverse funding streams for innovation and 
healthcare. In adopting a course of reactionary regulatory accumulation, these countries are 
following the lamentable path of developed countries, and should be cautious about doing so. 
 Third, bespoke regulation serves multiple ends. In addition to promoting safety and 
rational risk management, which are key targets for biosciences innovation regulation all 
around the world, it offers legitimacy, signalling to publics that the undertaking is sanctioned. 
This, in turn, is seen as having knock-on effects for open science, public debate, and transparent 
governance. Importantly, however, not just any regulation will do; the failure of the Indian 
medical devices regulation to raise the quality of domestic devices demonstrates that great 
care must be taken around regulatory objectives and means if regulation is to deliver on its 
multiple promises. The evidence from both jurisdictions supports the claim that social 
objectives and performance standards need to be participatively agreed and clearly identified, 
oversight must be institutionalised, and correctional authority must be enumerated if the 
regulated fields are to achieve their potential and not contribute to even greater patient risks. 
 Fourth, the case-studies support the claim that there is an appetite for (state) regulators 
to be ‘first movers’ in designing regulation in cooperation with key stakeholders. The failure to 
act in a timely and proactive way has had multiple consequences: in Argentina, it has largely 
silenced the scientific community in the face of vociferous opponents, thereby surrendering the 
public discourse to oppositional organisations and to unethical operators offering ill-considered 
or ineffective experimental treatments; in India, it has opened the market to domestic 
counterfeiters and foreign devices dumpers, again leaving the patient to suffer the 
consequences, and regulation fashioned by the courts in the context of a case (rather than by 
the legislature after due consideration) has proven ill-conceived and ineffective. Adopting a 
regulatory agenda wherein key non-government but intellectually engaged actors are given a 
role in steering the form and content of the regulation (so that it is sensitive to the needs of the 
regulated environment) but without turning the undertaking over to those interested 
stakeholders altogether is an important aspect of achieving jurisdiction-sensitive ‘optimal 
regulation’. Such can create a more positive environment more conducive to innovation. 
 Fifth, not only should emerging jurisdictions like Argentina and India eschew the ‘do we 
/ don’t we’ dichotomy, but they should eschew the un-reflexive redeployment of regulation 
borrowed from other settings or jurisdictions, for these models are likely shaped by very 
different contexts and experiences. Research has already demonstrated how regulatory 
systems can motivate particular behaviour patterns among those regulated, which means that 
context is important (Milne and Tait, 2009; Chataway, Tait and Wield, 2006). In emerging 
countries such as Argentina and India, regulation might therefore be expected to play a 
somewhat different (or more multifarious) role than its counterparts in developed countries. 
Thus, emerging countries should avoid recreating the regulatory complexity, accumulation, and 
fragmentation that characterises the most likely emulated models (eg: EU or US models), and 
rather focus on how to achieve more ‘optimal’ and ‘joined-up’ regulation.24 
                                            
24  We are familiar with the literature around ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres and Brathwaite 1992), ‘smart 
regulation’ (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998), ‘problem-centred regulation’ (Sparrow 2000), and ‘really responsive 
regulation’ (Baldwin and Black 2008) and contend that, to be ‘optimal’, regulation would have to be cognizant of 
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Regarding ‘optimality’, they must design regulation that has its own clear social 
objectives shaped by the specific context in which it is expected to operate, but that is also 
keenly aware of the other regimes to which actors in the field are beholden. Ideally, the 
resultant regulation might not rely too heavily on rules, but rather on values or principles and 
properly supported expert authorities to help industry implement them. Regarding ‘joined up-
ness’, three issues are pertinent. First, the regulation should be crafted with partner or 
associated fields (and their regulatory demands and burdens) in mind so as to avoid conflicting 
standards and reduce the regulatory cost of operating (through duplication of regulatorily-
imposed actions). Second, it should be crafted so as to dovetail with international standards 
and/or systems; it must strive for some level of harmonisation of terms and responsibilities, 
thereby paralleling the international nature of the science and its markets. Third, it should 
remain explicitly aware of the stage in the innovation process at which the regulated action sits. 
Being ‘joined-up’ in this context means being careful to articulate values commiserate with that 
stage and setting responsibilities in recognition of those that precede and follow that stage. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
To conclude, we argue that both sound healthcare interventions and socially useful innovation 
may be best encouraged through regulatory innovation, and here emerging jurisdictions are in 
a strong position to ‘leapfrog’ developed jurisdictions reliant on more entrenched regulatory 
instruments and pathways. The development of ‘optimal regulation’ which does not slavishly 
copy existing models is within the capabilities of emerging countries if they are conscious of the 
precedents and sensitive to their own social needs. With respect to the former, examples of 
regulatory innovation which has led to technical innovation include California’s efforts around 
the environment, the US’s efforts around orphan drugs, and India’s efforts around the licensing 
of patented medicines. In pursuing this regulatory innovation, international standards have an 
important role to play, but actors must be cautious about bowing to international health 
politics, and, importantly, regulators must know when to stop ‘innovating’ and let the system 
run (Black et al. 2005). 
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